












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































There is a huge literature on real business investment. It re°ects the importance of
investment both as a component, and as a determinant, of economic activity. It also
re°ects the considerable empirical and theoretical di±culties associated withtheanalysis
of capital spending. The ¯rst main stream of that literature, exempli¯ed in the survey
by Robert Chirinko (1993), or in the recent paper by Abel and Eberly (1994), is based
on the neoclassical tradition and still largely neglects important issues of agency and
information.
Yet, investment, asperhaps themost important business decision, isat thecore of the
corporate governance challenge. In the introduction of its 1994 survey of that subject,
The Economist wrote: `::: managers have become insu±ciently accountable to share-
holders. From blatant thievery, such as that by Robert Maxwell, to lousy investments
(Japanese ¯rms' purchases of overpriced American property or American Express's at-
tempt tobecomea ¯nancial conglomerate), to failuresto tacklelooming problemsquickly
enough, as at IBM, there is ample evidence of waste that might have been avoided had
bosses been on a tighter rein.'
A second stream of literature is concerned with capital structure, agency costs, asym-
metric information, and corporate control considerations. While it has paid particular
attention to the ¯nancial side of the investment equation (see Harris and Raviv, 1991),
that literature has also established that information asymmetry a®ects real investment
in various ways.
These two streams of literature are no longer independent. For example information
asymmetry isroutinely invokedto introduce liquidity constraintsinto otherwisestandard
models of capital accumulation. However, while the cost of adjustment model is one the
most widely used models of invesment, the implications of information asymmetry on
its predictions have not been formally investigated.
1Our paper is a contribution toward ¯lling this gap. We study a principal-agent re-
lationship with investors (inside or outside shareholders) as principal, and managers as
the agent. The model could also apply to situations involving a regulator as principal,
and the ¯rm as agent. Unlike the standard agency model, the capital stock in our model
evolves over time. Contrary to what might have been expected, the reward structure
does not display the usual monotonic distortion which is characteristic of the standard
agency model. We obtain several surprising results which add some hitherto ignored
considerations to real investment decisions and their determinants, and which illustrate
the implications of introducing dynamic considerations to standard principal-agent mod-
els. Thus we ¯nd that situations may occur where both the low cost, and the high cost,
types are asked to carry out the same investment as they would under full information, if
the principal faced the same shadow price of capital. However, because the shadow price
of capital is a®ected by informational asymmetry, we ¯nd that the investment behavior
of all types must in fact be modi¯ed relative to the full information situation. We also
show that investment behavior under asymmetric information exhibits hysteresis, al-
though for reasons quite di®erent from those described by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Of
course, these results depend on the seriousness of informational asymmetries; in contrast
with otherwise similar adjustment cost models (Abel, 1983; Caballero, 1991) an increase
in uncertainty, taking the form of an increase in the spread of types, has a depressing
e®ect on investment. Our model also raises some questions on the applicability of the q
theory of investment when there is informational asymmetry. We show that evaluating
the shadow price of capital by market mechanisms raises a much more serious issue than
the well understood problem of the identity between average and marginal capital value.
Since the relevant rent actually is split between shareholders and managers, and the
stock exchange only provides information on the share accruing to the formers, stock
prices may fail to re°ect all the relevant considerations.
2We describe and further motivate the model in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted
to solving the problem of the principal, which is to tell managers what investment to
choose, given their informational advantage and con°icting objective. The similarity of
our basic model with the standard cost of adjustment model allows easy comparisons
with the latter, in particular with the extended model of Abel and Eberly. In Section 4,
we identify and explain the qualitative di®erences and similarities in the predictions of
our model andthe standardcost of adjustment model. Wealso discusstheimplicationsof
information asymmetry on the q theory of investment and, more generally, the additional
contribution of our model to major existing models of real business investment.
2 The model
As mentioned earlier, there are several reasons why the objectives of managers and of
shareholders may not coincide, and why managers may have an informational advantage
over shareholders. Harris and Raviv (1991), although with a focus on implications for
capital structure, survey most of them. Since many capital structure decisions aim at
improving real investment decisions, they are relevant to our discussion. The reader is
referred to their paper for details and references.
Con°icts between shareholders and managers may arise because managers hold only
part of the residual claim. Rather than devoting themselves entirely to pro¯t enhancing
objectives, they may withhold information about the best investment prospects in order
to promote decisions more favorable to their own personal bene¯ts. Another type of
con°ict may arise because shareholders have an incentive to invest suboptimally under
limitedliability: if a project issuccessful, they capture most of thegain, but if the project
fails, they cannot lose more than their investment. On the other hand, managers may
lose their reputation in a bankruptcy (Diamond, 1989; Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1989).
Similarly, it has been shown by Myers and Majluf (1984) that, if outside investors are
3less well-informed than managers about the value of the ¯rm's assets, `then equity may
be mispriced by the market. If an investment is to be ¯nanced by issuing new equity,
underpricing may be so severethat newinvestorscapture morethan thenet present value
of the project, resulting in a net loss' (Harris and Raviv, p.306) to insiders, including
managers if they own equity.
These are some of the reasons why shareholders' and managers' objectives may con-
°ict. Our model will most directly re°ect those where managers try to enhance their
own well-being while shareholders try to keep the highest possible expected surplus to
themselves.1 Several avenues may be available to (partially) resolve this con°ict. We fo-
cus on one of them, by modelling a principal-agent relationship, where the shareholders
act as a principal while managers, as a group, are their agent.
The objective of the agent is the maximization of managers' residual claim, expected
cumulative discounted revenues net of relevant costs, minus transfers to the principal.
The objective of the principal is to maximize a weighted sum of what is left to the agent
and what is transferred to her. The case where the principal assigns a zero weight to
the objective of the agent is admitted. In a crude way, a positive weight may re°ect the
fact that shareholders often hold administrative positions themselves in other ¯rms, so
that they may show concern for the well-being of managers as a profession, and the fact
that managers usually hold shares in their own company. Both the principal and the
agent have the same discount rate.
Consider the simplest possible technology, giving output at date t as a concave,
di®erentiable, positively monotonic function of the stock of capital (time subscripts will
be omitted where no ambiguity arises)
qt = g(kt)
1While the model would have to be altered if it was to focus on the other types of con°icts listed
above, the spirit of the exercise would remain the same.
4Capital may be interpreted to include plant and equipment, but also goodwill acquired
through advertising or other marketing expenses, knowhow, the size and training level
of the labor force, etc.. We assume that g0(k) is ¯nite and g(k) is non negative for any
non negative k. Capital evolves according to investment it. For simplicity, assume that
there is no depreciation, so that
kt+1 = kt + it ; kt ¸ 0 (1)
The cost of investment is assumed to consist of the asset cost of equipment vi, plus a
cost of adjustment which we take to be quadratic: ai + 1
2bi2. Thus, in total, the cost of





As argued above, there are several reasons why the agent might prefer the principal
not to know this cost with certainty. There are also several reasons why this cost may
be private information. Consider v. Whether equipment is being sold or purchased,
the transaction price may di®er from the posted price by an amount which depends
on the relationship between the parties to the transaction. An extreme case would be
transactions involving kickbacks. Such cost components are likely to be unknown to
the principal, whether it is a board of shareholders or a government. Also, access to
¯nancing may depend on the relationship between managers and lenders; once ¯nancing
costs are capitalized into the asset price, personal di®erences imply that the asset cost
component of the cost of investment is ¯rm speci¯c, possibly unknown to shareholders.
Similarly a may re°ect ¯rm, or manager, speci¯c inconveniences associated with changes
in size and organization; this is likely to be private information and, as we argue further
below, of interest to the principal. More generally, since expected investment returns
determine the relative cost of investment, assuming that the cost of investment is private
5information will serve to model the idea that managers are better informed about both
returns and costs than shareholders.
Assuming for simplicity that the public information component of v+ a is zero, and
that b is common knowledge, the cost of investment may be written





where µt > 0 is a privately observed parameter that varies from period to period. This
formulation is also compatible with a focus on the cost of intermediation, as in Bernanke
and Gertler (1989), or Cooper (1994), where variations in the cost of capital accumula-
tion re°ect °uctuations in the frequency of monitoring a representative project. Man-
agers may be better aware of such costs than shareholders2.
In order to focus on the e®ect of asymmetric information on investment decisions,
we eliminate also any common uncertainty: future prices pt are known with certainty
and technology does not change over time. These assumptions are inconsequential for
our purposes and have the advantage of simplicity3. We also assume that the µ's are




at all dates. Thus knowing µ at any date t does not provide any
information about its subsequent values. This assumption may not be very realistic; it
clari¯es the role of asymmetric information by ensuring that the sole source of dynamics
in the model is the investment process. As in the standard cost of adjustment model
2Altering Cooper's formulation slightly in order to allow for capital to be durable, we may write
kt+1 = kt+~ µit where ~ µ re°ects the cost of intermediation: a given investment e®ort may a®ect the stock
of capital di®erently, according to the value of ~ µ. Allowing for costs of adjustment, the corresponding
cost is vit + 1
2b[kt+1 ¡ kt]
2. Consequently, the cost of obtaining kt+1 given that the current stock is kt
is v
~ µ [kt+1 ¡kt]+ 1
2b[kt+1 ¡ kt]
2 which is analogous to (2).
3In the problem presented below, it may alternatively be assumed that future output prices and
technology are stochastic and combine in such a way that net revenues at date t are R(kt;²t), where
²t follows a Brownian motion. As long as there is no asymmetry in the observation of ²t, the standard
dynamic programming solution approach will apply in that case and our qualitative results will not be
a®ected.
6of investment, the sole reason why the decision maker must be forward looking is that
it is in¯nitely costly to change the level of capital instantaneously, and that current
investment decisions a®ect future capital levels.
The objective of the agent, ¦t, may be decomposed into current net pro¯t ¼t and
expected cumulative discounted net future pro¯t Ãt, from t + 1 on, as evaluated at t.
For the technology just described, this means maximizing







¡Rt + Ãt (kt+1)
(3)
subject to (1), where Rt is the amount transferred to the principal. R may be thought
of as dividends demanded by the principal.
Asexplainedearlier, we assumethat one dollar left to the agent isworth®; 0 · ® < 1











¡ Rt + Ãt
¾
+ Rt + ¡ (kt+1) (4)
subject to (1) and the rationality constraint ¦t ¸ 0, where ¡ (kt+1) is cumulative dis-
counted transfers to the principal from t + 1 on, as expected at t.
In therest of this Section, wesolvethe symmetricinformationversionof this problem.
This solution will serve as a benchmark against which we will compare the solution of
the asymmetric information problem. We will add the superscript s to refer to variables
or functions that are de¯ned or evaluated under symmetric information. Thus, the use
of ¡s and Ãs will indicate that the principal is aware that future decisions will be made
in a symmetric information setup.
Under symmetric information, µ is observed by boththe principal and the agent upon
its realization. Since the principal has the power to set R, it is obvious that her best
choice, at all dates, is to set R in such a way that ¦ = 0, leaving the agent indi®erent
7between participating in the relationship or not. Consequently, problem (4) is equivalent













subject to (1). This is a simpli¯ed, but standard, version of the cost of adjustment









t is the shadow price of capital, the discounted sum of expected future marginal
revenue products. Thus, if t happens to be the last period, ¡s and its derivatives vanish,
so that i is negative: since there is no use keeping any capital for future periods, it is
desirable to sell as much of the remaining stock as possible, while keeping adjustment
costs to an acceptable level. If, instead, t is the second last period, then keeping a
marginal unit of capital for period t + 1 yields an advantage of ¡s0 = ±pt+1g0(kt+1) in
terms of increased future production, where ± is the discount factor, 0 < ± < 1. This
marginal value product of capital is non stochastic. However, suppose now that there
might be yet an extra period t+2; then, since µt+1 is unknown, it+1, which will be given
by (5) at t + 1, is unknown at t; as a result, the marginal product of kt+2; g0(kt+2), is
unknown at t, so that the marginal impact on future revenues of increasing the stock of
capital at t is stochastic.
De¯ne T as the ¯rst interruption in production, or, equivalently, the ¯rst date at
which k is zero4. In general, T, if ¯nite, is unknown and stochastic. Then the shadow
4Depending on the trajectory of p, production may start again after an interruption. However mar-
ginal products in the new production phase will be independent of capital levels before the interruption,
which justi¯es de¯ning T as the ¯rst interruption.











As (5) indicates, when µ ishighrelative to ¡s0, it is desirable to sell capital; otherwise it is
desirable to buy. Thisdepends on whether future output prices are high and on expected
future levels of k, as they develop when (5) is applied after successive realizations of µ.
To avoid technical di±culties, we rule out bubbles, that is price trajectories that would
cause ¡s0 (and is) to be in¯nite.
3 The model under asymmetric information
3.1 Preliminary remarks
Consider now the asymmetric information case. µ is observed upon its realization by
the agent. Consequently, the principal must rely on the information given to her by
the agent in order to pursue her objective. Since there is no intertemporal correlation
between the µ's, the agent does not lose any of his future informational advantage when
herevealscurrent informationto theprincipal. Asa consequence, if the principal chooses
to use an incentive mechanism, there is no possibility of a ratchet e®ect as in La®ont
and Tirole (1988), and the revelation principle applies as in static setups.
We assume that the principal cannot credibly give up her claim to a share in any
future rents in exchange for a lump-sum payment whose amount would be agreed upon
before future cost conditions are revealed to the agent. This assumption is justi¯ed
by wealth constraints on managers. Indeed, almost by de¯nition, the existence of a
publicly-held ¯rm implies that managerial skills and wealth are held by separate groups
of individuals. We do assume, however, that the principal is able to commit to one-
9period contracts. Thus, during any period, shareholders will keep the managers if they
receive the dividends and see the action (investment) that were agreed upon.
Under such circumstances, the best the principal can do is to design a succession of
one-period contracts or mechanisms in such a way as to maximize her objective subject
to her informational disadvantage. By the revelation principle, whenever the contracts
discriminate between types,they must induce the agent to reveal his private information,
which requires the properties described below.
3.2 The incentive contract











where ^ µt represents the level of µt announced by the agent when selecting a pair from
the menu. In order to induce truthful revelation at t, the menu must be such that it is
in the interest of the agent to choose ^ µ = µ 8µ 2
£
µL;µH¤
. The objective of the agent is





























where, unless otherwise mentioned, variables (functions) are evaluated (de¯ned) at t.
De¯ne the optimized value of Á as
¦(µ) = Á(µ;µ)









Furthermore, as a rationality condition, the contract must be such that, for any partic-
ipating agent
¦ ¸ 0 (9)
Although it is clear from (6) that ¦ is made up of a current component plus a component
corresponding to future pro¯ts, where both components are net of transfers to share-
holders, (9) does not imply a commitment by the principal to keep the same manager in
the future. It implies that, if the agent is ¯red at t, he gets a compensation of Ã. Our
assumption is that shareholders are able to commit to one period contracts involving
such golden parachutes5.
3.3 The problem of the principal
At any date t, given k, and under constraints (7), (8), and (9), the principal must choose
functions i(µ) and R(µ) in such a way as to maximize
E f®¦(µ) + R(µ) + ¡(k + i(µ))g
Substituting the de¯nitionof ¦, using (6), and rearranging, this is equivalent to choosing








2 ¡ [1¡ ®]¦(µ) + S (k + i(µ))
¾
f (µ)dµ (10)
5If golden parachutes were not available, a second rationality constraint requiring current net cash
°ows ¼ to be non negative would have to be satis¯ed. Since Ã is non negative and ¦ = ¼ + Ã, that
constraint is at least as strict as (9). Thus golden parachutes allow shareholders to operate in a less
constrained environment.
11subject to (7), (8), and (9), where S (k + i), de¯ned as ¡a(k + i) + ªa(k + i), is the
sum of surpluses to be shared by the agent and the principal at, and beyond, t + 1, as
expected at t and discounted to t. As indicated by the superscripts a, it is understood
that future decisions will be made in the same asymmetric information setup so that S
re°ects this knowledge.6
Problem (10) can be treated as an optimal control problem, where i is the control
variable and where ¦, the state variable, is subject to a non negativity constraint. De¯ne
L(¦;i;¹;¸;k) =
½




2 ¡ [1¡ ®]¦(µ) + S (k + i(µ))
¾
f (µ)
¡¹(µ)i(µ) + ¸(µ)¦(µ) (11)
where ¸ ¸ 0 and ¹ respectively are the Lagrangian multiplier associated with constraint
(9) and the costate variable associated with ¦. At this stage, constraint (7) is being
ignored; we will make use of it intheprocess of selecting a candidate solution, andwe will
specify, ex post, conditions under which it is satis¯ed by the unconstrained solution. One











where S0, theshadowvalueof capital, representsthecombinedvalue to boththe principal
and the agent of expected discounted future marginal products. This rule di®ers from
its symmetric-information counterpart (5) in two important ways. First, since the share
accruing to the principal under symmetric information is the total surplus, ¡s in (5) is
the analog of S in (12); however, surpluses will normally di®er under symmetric and
under asymmetric, information as the investment programs implied by (5) and (12) will
6We assume that S (k+1) exists and is continuously di®erentiable and concave for any k+1 ¸ 0; this
implies that we rule out price trajectories that would cause S0 to be in¯nite (as was done with ¡s0 under
symmetric information).
12usually di®er. Consequently, the ¯rst term on the right-hand side of (5) will normally
di®er from the ¯rst term on the right-hand side of (12), although they measure the
same concept. Second, and more familiar, is the presence of an extra term, ¡
¹(µ)
bf(µ), in
the expression. As in static principal-agent models, this term causes a distortion to
the operative decisions of the agent. As will be shown below, unlike static asymmetric
information production models where agents are typically induced to produce less than
under full information, this term may be positive or negative, causing i to be either
higher, or lower, than under full information. Perhaps more fundamental a di®erence
will be the fact, established further below, that the solution is not fully separating under
conventional assumptions on f (µ).





= [1¡ ®]f (µ) ¡ ¸(µ) (13)
Integrating gives
¹(µ) = [1¡ ®]F (µ) + A ¡ ¤(µ) (14)





measures the cumulative impact on the objective of the principal, of meeting rationality
constraints (9) for all types ~ µ · µ.
3.4 Solution
Inproblems with constraints on the state variables such as (10), discontinuitiesincostate
variables may occur only at junctions between an interval where the state constraint is
13binding and an interval where it is not binding7. The continuity of ¹ elsewhere will
be useful to characterize the solution. It is also useful to note that the ¯rst two terms
on the right-hand side of (14), together, are strictly increasing in µ while the last term
goes the opposite way. Thus, on intervals over which ¸ is positive (¦ = 0), ¹ may be
increasing or decreasing; when ¸ = 0, ¹ is strictly monotonic; at junctions ¹ may have a
discontinuity. Similarly, ¤(µ) is continuous as an integral of multipliers and the control
variable i is continuous except, possibly, at junctions between intervals where ¦ = 0 and
intervals where ¦ > 0. Furthermore, given our assumption that S0 is ¯nite, adjustment







be an interval over which (9) is binding; de¯ne µ¡ by the con-
dition that ¦(µ¡) = 0 and, if µ¡ 6= µL, then ¦(µ) > 0 for any µ < µ¡ in a neighborhood
of µ¡; de¯ne µ+ by the condition that ¦(µ+) = 0 and, if µ+ 6= µH, then ¦(µ) > 0 for any
µ > µ+ in a neighborhood of µ+. Thus, locally, [µ¡;µ+] is the largest possible interval




contains zero, one, or several (disjoint) intervals satisfying the de¯nition





Depending on the position of [µ¡;µ+] in
£
µL;µH¤
, the trajectories of ¦ and ¸ over
£
µL;µH¤
must conform to one of ¯ve cases. This is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If it exists, the candidate solution must fall under one of the following
¯ve cases:
² Case 1: µ¡ = µ+ = µL; ¸(µ) = 0 8µ; ¦(µ) > 0 8µ > µL; ¦
¡
µL¢
= 0. In this case:




7See Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1986, chapter 5). Their su±ciency conditions for asolution may be ap-
plied in this context. An important characteristic of these conditions is the possibility of discontinuities
in the solution i(µ) and in ¹(µ) when ¦ = 0.
142. i(µ) < 0 8µ;
3. ¦(µ) is strictly positively monotonic.
² Case 2: µ¡ = µL < µ+ < µH; ¦(µ) = 0 8µ 2
£
µL;µ+¤
; ¸(µ) = 0 and ¦(µ) >
0; 8µ > µ+. In this case:




2. i(µ) = 0 8µ < µ+; i(µ) < 0 8µ ¸ µ+;
3. ¦(µ) is strictly positively monotonic 8µ ¸ µ+.
² Case 3: µL < µ¡ < µ+ · µH; ¸(µ) = 0 and ¦(µ) > 0 8µ < µ¡; ¦(µ) = 0 8µ 2
[µ¡;µ+]; ¸(µ) = 0 and ¦(µ) > 0 8µ > µ+. In this case:








2. i(µ) > 0 8µ · µ¡; i(µ) = 0, µ¡ < µ < µ+; i(µ) < 0 8µ ¸ µ+;
3. ¦(µ) is strictly positively (negatively) monotonic 8µ ¸ µ+ ( 8µ · µ¡);
4. µ¡ 6= µ+.
² Case 4: µL < µ¡ · µ+ = µH; ¸(µ) = 0 and ¦(µ) > 0 8µ < µ¡; ¦(µ) = 0; 8µ 2
£
µ¡;µH¤
. In this case:







2. i(µ) > 0 8µ · µ¡; i(µ) = 0 8µ > µ¡;
3. ¦(µ) is strictly negatively monotonic 8µ · µ¡.









2. i(µ) > 0 8µ;
3. ¦(µ) is strictly negatively monotonic.
Proof.







are transversality conditions. In Case 3, ¹(µ¡) > 0 follows
from the fact that ¹ strictly rises from ¹
¡
µL¢
= 0 to ¹(µ¡); similarly, ¹(µ+) < 0




2. In all cases, i(µ) = 0 whenever ¦(µ) = 0 because of (8). Now we prove that
i(µ) < 0 8µ in case 1. Starting from ¦
¡
µL¢
= 0, ¦ is to become positive; given
(8), it follows that i
¡
µL¢
must be negative; because of (7), i will then remain
negative over the rest of the interval. The sign of i in other cases is established in
a similar way.
3. In all cases, the claimed monotonicity of ¦ is implied by (8) and the sign of i over
the relevant interval.
4. To show that µ¡ 6= µ+ in case 3, suppose otherwise. Given the monotonicity of ¹






= 0, there must
be a discontinuity in ¹ at µ+ = µ¡, with ¹(µ¡) > 0 and ¹(µ+) < 0; since @ia
@¹ < 0
by (12), it follows that i(µ+) > 0, a contradiction.
Proposition 1 describes the qualitative properties of all possible solutions. The ¯ve
cases are illustrated in Figure 1. Case 1 represents a situation where the interval [µ¡;µ+]
is squeezed to the left of
£
µL;µH¤
and is actually reduced to µL. In other cases, the
interval isprogressively shiftedto theright, so that case5 representsasituationwherethe
16interval is reduced to µH. For each case, the ¯gure gives the optimal investment, pro¯t,
and shadow price of pro¯t satisfying the qualitative properties stated in Proposition 1.
As will be shown below, these situations occur according to the magnitude of S0. To
complete the characterization, we pick a candidate solution that assumes the absence of
any discontinuities in ¹ at µ+ and µ¡, and we verify that it satis¯es all other conditions
in Seierstad and Sydsaeter's su±ciency theorem, allowing us to conclude that it solves
problem (10). By Lemma 2 (see Appendix), such a solution exists if f satis¯es the
following assumption.









The solution is described in the following propositions, proven in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 If ¹(µ) is continuous over
£
µL;µH¤
, it is given, in cases 1-3 and 4-5
respectively, by





¹(µ) = [1¡ ®]F (µ) ¡ ¤(µ) (17)
where ¤ (µ) = 0 8µ in cases 1 and 5, while, in cases 2 and 3, ¤(µ) = 0 8µ · µ¡,
























¡ [S0 ¡ µ]
¸
f (µ) (19)
The function ¤ in Proposition 2 is well de¯ned. However, by its de¯nition (15), it
must also be increasing. Lemma 2 ensures that this is true.




This is done in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If ¹(µ) is continuous over
£
µL;µH¤


























+ 1¡ ® (21)




, they also satisfy µ¡ < µ+. The next proposition speci¯es the values of
the shadow price of capital that cause each of the ¯ve cases to arise.
Proposition 4 Let S0
1 < µL and S0

















¡ [1 ¡ ®] (23)
Then cases 1-5 arise according to the value of S0 relative to S0
1, µL, µHand S0
4:
² Case 1 corresponds to: S0 · S0
1 < µL;
18² Case 2 corresponds to: S0
1 < S0 · µL;
² Case 3 corresponds to: µL · µ¡ · S0 · µ+ · µH where the left two inequalities
are strict unless S0 = µL and the right two inequalities are strict unless S0 = µH;
² Case 4 corresponds to: µH < S0 < S0
4;
² Case 5 corresponds to: S0 ¸ S0
4 > µH.
The candidate solution described in propositions 1-4 exists since it was obtained by
construction. It satis¯es all conditions for an optimum except that (7) was not imposed,
that the monotonicity of ¤ was not veri¯ed, and that the condition µ¡ < µ+ was not
veri¯ed. By Lemma 2, Assumption 1 is su±cient for these properties to be satis¯ed.
4 Discussion
The optimal program under asymmetric information di®ers notably from its full infor-
mation counterpart. The most visible di®erence is the pooling phase (at i = 0) that
occurs between negative, and positive investment regimes under asymmetric informa-
tion. Under symmetric information, as (5) clearly shows, investment is positive if ¡s0,
the marginal value of capital in terms of expected discounted future surpluses, is higher
than µ and vice versa; there is no interval of µ between the two regimes over which i = 0.
Informational asymmetry usually introduces ine±ciency under assumptions similar to
those made here, but without causing such pooling. What happens here isthat there is a
con°ict between two incentives to misrepresent µ. A manager whose µ would place him
in the category of capital buyers under full information has an incentive to overstate
µ in order to overstate his cost of buying; but too big an overstatement might place
him in a high µ group of types who should normally sell capital under full information.
However, for sellers, the incentive to misrepresent goes in the opposite direction: they
19should understate µ to understate their revenues from selling. Managers whose µ is close
to S0, the marginal value of capital at which investment would switch from negative
to positive under full information, would face such a dilemma. Precisely, all types in
[µ¡;µ+] face that dilemma, which is resolved by asking them not to invest. Thissituation
involving con°icting incentives is an example of `In°exible Rules in Incentive Problems'
as analyzed by Lewis and Sappington (1989). It arises here naturally rather than being
engineered by a principal in order to alleviate an incentive problem as in their case.
For types whose cost of capital is close to the S0, the loss from setting i = 0 is low
relative to the saving that such ine±ciency allows in the cost of inducing more pro¯table
types to reveal their true µ. Such pro¯table types may occur at both ends of the µ
spectrum, with pro¯ts being generated either by buying (low µ), or selling (high µ)
capital. Taking Case 3 as an example, this appears more clearly if (12) is written (using
Proposition 2) in the following form




S0 + [1¡ ®]l(µ) ; µ ¸ µ+
S0 ¡ [1¡ ®]h(µ) ; µ · µ¡
(24)
The left-hand side is the cost of the marginal unit of capital, inclusive of its adjustment
cost component. For ¯rms at either end of
£
µL;µH¤
, the second term on the right-hand
side of the appropriate line vanishes, implying that marginal cost is set equal to S0. This
is indeed the same rule as under full information, (misleadingly) suggesting that types
µL and µH are asked to behave e±ciently. Since S0 2 [µ¡;µ+] (Proposition 4), µL < S0
and µH > S0, so that this rule requires low µ types to buy capital and high µ types to sell.
In contrast, types whose µ is closer to S0 are being asked to deviate from that rule by an
amount proportional to l or h. Since l is non increasing and non positive, and h is non
decreasing and non negative, the wedge is wider, the closer µ is to the relevant switching
value (µ¡or µ+). This is illustrated in Figure 2 for a uniform distribution of µ over [1;2]
20with b = 1. Applying rule (24) beyond type µ+ (µ¡) would imply requesting a positive
(negative) investment from a type that would be asked to sell (buy) capital under full
information at identical marginal value of capital. The optimal contract re°ects the fact
that it is less costly, in terms of e±ciency loss, to choose pooling, instead, in the vicinity
of S0. Thus there is a third instance of (apparent) e±cient behavior: when µ is equal to
S0, the agent invests zero as would be the case under full information.
As hinted above, one would be mistaken to believe that types µL, µH, and S0 are
asked to invest as under full information. Although the rule is the same as under full
information for these types, there is ine±ciency, arising from the fact that, at any given
k, S0 di®ers from its full information counterpart ¡s0. This di®erence appears because,
whatever its current type, there is a strictly positive probability (unless T is known to
be within two periods) that, in the future, an agent will be asked to invest a di®erent
amount than would be warranted under symmetric information.
The distinction between S0 and ¡s0 also has implications for interpreting Tobin's
q. Under symmetric information, according to the q theory of investment, the stock
exchange valuation V of a ¯rm provides a measure of the total value of its assets. Under
appropriate assumptions (Hayashi, 1982; Abel and Eberly, 1994), this also applies at
the margin, so that V
k provides a measure of the contribution to V of the marginal (and
average) unit of capital, as it is perceived by the market8. In our notation, V
k would then
provide a measure of ¡s0. According to the q theory, investment should be chosen in such
a way as to equate the marginal cost of acquiring one unit of capital with ¡s0, and the
unobserved ¡s0 should be replaced with V
k in the investment equation: bis
t+µ = V
k , where
µ is interpretedto include the market purchase price pK. Under asymmetric information,
the shadow price of capital S0 cannot be measured in the same way: the reason is that
S is a surplus to be shared between the principal and the agent (S ´ ¡a + Ãa), while
8The identi¯cation of marginal q with average q is a restriction that can be circumvented; see Abel
and Blanchard (1986). This does not a®ect our argument.
21the stock exchange measures only the portion ¡a that accrues to the principal under
asymmetric information. Furthermore, it is clear, in our simple speci¯cation of the
asymmetric information model, that the relative size of ¡a and Ãa is sensitive to the
parameters of the problem. Consequently, the proportional error made by measuring S
using stock exchange valuation is likely to be highly variable both across ¯rms, across
sectors, and over time9. This might be yet another explanation for the lack of reliability
of q models of investment. In fact there is evidence that Tobin's q, as measured by the
ratio of ¡a over the replacement cost of tangible assets, might be sensitive to information
asymmetries. The literature on diversi¯cation and performance provides evidence that
Tobin's q is negatively correlated with the degree of diversi¯cation when diversi¯cation
is into unrelated businesses. This evidence is discussed and complemented by Lang and
Stulz (1994). It may imply that agency costs are higher in ¯rms that diversify into
unrelated business than in more focused ¯rms (i.e. S < ¡s), but also that the share of S
appropriable by shareholders, ¡a, which is what markets measure, is lower in unfocused
¯rms than in focused ones.
As was mentioned earlier, the qualitative nature of our results is una®ected if µ is
de¯ned to include, besides an idiosyncratic component, the observable asset price of
equipment pK. The pooling that occurs under asymmetric information provides a new
explanation for investment to be insensitive to variations in the cost of capital and in
the shadow value of capital over certain ranges. Abel and Eberly (1994) summarize
conditions under which the standard cost of adjustment model of investment involves
i = 0 over an asset price region. In the absence of any non negativity constraint,
one possibility is the presence of a ¯xed cost for any non zero level of investment; in
that case, however, there are discontinuities in the optimal investment function which
do not arise in our model. Another possibility is the presence of a kink in the cost
9There is evidence of such variability in the recent empirical literature. See Demers et al. (1994).
22of investment function at i = 0, either due to the di®erent nature of negative, versus
positive, investment, or to a di®erence between purchase and resale prices. Here, there
is no discontinuity in the optimal investment function so that its qualitative properties,
as a relationship between investment and its cost, are similar to the properties of ia.
Although not distinguishable in that respect, the two models di®er in the investment
uncertainty relationship. This is discussed further below.
Besides the standard neoclassical theory of investment, the optimality of not reacting
to a changing environment, over a certain range, has been identi¯ed and discussed in a
growing literature on hysteresis. As far as investment theory is concerned, this literature
is best presentedin Dixit andPindyck (1994). Facedwith an irreversible decisionto take
under uncertainty, ¯rms valuepositively the optionof waiting for more information. This
introduces a wedge, the option value, between the cost of investment and its expected
marginal product value. This option value explains why, over a certain range, ¯rms
optimally choose not to react to variations in the cost of investment or in the expected
marginal product value. As when ¯xed costs are associated with non null investment
levels, which indeed makes the investment decision irreversible, there are discontinuities
between inactionregimes and regimesof active investment, asopposedto theasymmetric
information model.
Thus our model implies an observationally di®erent investment behavior than the
most well-known alternatives. One apparent exception is the cost-of-adjustment model
when there is a kink in the cost of adjustment at i = 0. Both models imply inaction
over some range in the cost of capital or its shadow value, and a progressive depar-
ture, without discontinuity, from that situation at values outside the inaction range.
However, the two models di®er in the way investment is a®ected by uncertainty. Com-
parisons are not straightforward though, because the types of uncertainties envisaged in
both models are somewhat di®erent: uncertainty about future capital productivity in
23the standard cost of adjustment model; uncertainty about the current cost of capital in
the asymmetric information model. In the asymmetric information model, an increase
in uncertainty, taking the form of a wider spread in the distribution of µ, will normally
reduce the absolute value of investment, as illustrated inFigure 3 for the uniform distrib-
ution. In contrast, in the kinked cost-of-adjustment model, the result of Abel (1983) and
Caballero (1991) apply: they ¯nd that increased uncertainty increases the investment
of competitive ¯rms with constant returns to scale, at least when the random shocks
are idiosyncratic to individual ¯rms, as they are in our model. Such reversals in the
positive correlation between uncertainty and investment as implied by our asymmetric
information model have been encountered in other contexts, and discussed extensively
by Caballero. He observes that adjustment-cost asymmetry, combined with imperfect
competition, produce this reversal in symmetric information models, underlining that
imperfect competition \is also the paramount factor". Our model exhibits this property
without adjustment-cost asymmetry or imperfect competition.
5 Conclusion
Investment theory, especially thebody of literatureunderlying thestudy of business¯xed
investment spending, largely neglects issues of agency and information. In this paper,
we have introduced asymmetry of information between shareholders and managers into
an otherwise standard cost of adjustment model of investment.
This produces an investment equation with clearly distinguishable features. The
most remarkable one is a new form of hysteresis which results from con°icting incentives
to misrepresent costs for certain types. Hysteresis arises when the con°ict is resolved
by the use of an in°exible rule as in Lewis and Sappington (1989). Departures from
the inaction regime are smooth as in the model of Abel and Eberley (1994) involving
adjustment costs with a kink at i = 0. However, their model can be distinguished from
24ours by the nature and role of uncertainty.
Our model also casts a new light on the q theory of investment. It shows that, if
information asymmetries are present, the shadow value of capital should be de¯ned to
includerentsaccruingto managers. Failingthat, q ispoorly andinconsistently measured.
From the point of view of agency theory, the investment model turns out to have
interesting peculiarities. First, our model introduces a form of dynamics which has
been neglected sofar in principal-agent models, although it is standard in other ¯elds of
economics. The intertemporal link is provided by capital and investment, but might as
well involve learning by doing or R&D. At ¯rst sight, this type of dynamics does not
appear to a®ect the result, pervasive in static agency theory, according to which the
behavior of `good' types is the same as under full information. Thus the lowest-cost
manager is asked to chose i so as to equate marginal cost to the shadow price of capital
as under full information. However, since there is a positive probability of not being
lowest-cost in some future period, distortions will occur in the future almost certainly,
so that the shadow price of capital is di®erent than under full information: the same
investment rule yields a di®erent investment level.
Second, depending on the cost of capital, positive or negative investment may be
desirable to shareholders and managers. As a result `good' types, to whom a full infor-
mation investment rule applies, may coexist at both ends of the type range.
25LEMMAS AND PROOFS10
A Lemma 1
Lemma 1 There exists one and only one interval [µ¡;µ+], possibly reduced to a single




Proof. In order to show that there exists at least one interval, we show that ¦ > 0 8µ














= 0 and ¹
¡
µH¢
= 0 respectively, cannot be
both satis¯ed by a monotonic, continuous trajectory. Now suppose that there is more
than one interval satisfying the de¯nition of [µ¡;µ+]; by de¯nition the intervals must
be separated by intervals over which ¦ > 0; thus there exists µ1 < µ2 < µ3 such
that ¦(µ1) = 0, ¦(µ2) > 0, and ¦(µ3) = 0. Consequently, as µ increases from
µ1 to µ3, the continuous function ¦(µ) must ¯rst rise, which requires i < 0 by (8),
then diminish, which requires i > 0. This violates (7). It remains to show that
[µ¡;µ+] is di®erent from
£
µL;µH¤
. Suppose otherwise; then, by (8), in order to main-





pg(k) ¡ µi(µ) ¡ 1
2bi(µ)
2 ¡ [1 ¡ ®]¦(µ) + S (k + i(µ))
ª
f (µ)dµ, and since either
S0(k + i(µ)) > µL, or S0(k + i(µ)) < µH, or both, the program i = ¦ = 0 8µ may be
strictly improved, either (a) by setting i > 0 over a neighborhood of µL, or (b) by setting
i < 0 over a neighborhood of µH, or both. Let us show that this is feasible under the
constraints imposed by asymmetric information. Thus suppose (a) applies and choose
10Propositions or Lemmas are stated in the Appendix only if they are not stated in the main text.




, the di®erence between the






1 ¡ [1 ¡ ®]¦
1 (µ) + S (k + i1) ¡ pg(k) ¡ S (k) > ¢ > 0
where ¦1 (µ) is such that (8) is satis¯ed and ¦1 (£1) = 0: ¦1 (µ) = ¦L ¡ µi1. The
principal may ask agents of type µ < £1 to set i = i1, o®ering them ¦1 (µ), rather than
asking them to set i = 0 and o®ering them ¦ = 0. They will ¯nd it in their interest to
accept, each yielding an increment of at least ¢ to the objective of the principal. Thus





We start from (14) and use the transversality conditions corresponding to each case in
order to eliminate the constant of integration A. The assumed continuity of ¹ implies




free, so that ¹
¡
µH¢




¡ [1 ¡ ®]
Substituting into (14), recognizing that ¤
¡
µH¢
= ¤(µ+), gives (16). In cases 4-5, ¦
¡
µL¢
is free, so that ¹
¡
µL¢
= 0; it follows from (14) that A = 0 which in turn implies (17).
¤(µ) = 0 by de¯nition in cases 1 and 5. In cases 2 and 3, µ+ < µH, so that,
by de¯nition, ¤(µ) = ¤(µ+) 8 µ ¸ µ+. For µ · µ¡, by de¯nition, ¤(µ) = 0. For




may be found, then it is certain that a similar triplet corresponding to
(b), i2 < 0, £2, ¢ > 0 can be found such that, for µ 2
£
£2;µH¤




2 ¡ [1¡®]¦2(µ)+ S (k +i2) ¡pg(k) ¡ S(k) > ¢ > 0





[S0 ¡ µ] ¡
[1 ¡ ®][F (µ) ¡ 1] + ¤(µ+) ¡¤(µ)
f (µ)
¾
from which (18) follows. ¤(µ+) is obtained as follows. In case 2, writing (18) at µ¡ = µL,














(16) at µL, with ¤
¡
µL¢
= ¤(µ¡) = 0 by de¯nition, yields ¤(µ+) = [1¡ ®].
We turn to establishing (19): this is done by substituting (17) into (12), and setting
ia = 0.
C Proposition 3
Since µ¡ is the lowest level of µ at which constraint (9) is binding, ¤(µ¡) = 0. By
Proposition 1, at µ¡, i = 0. Writing (12) at µ¡, while substituting the formulas for











which reduces to (20). Similarly, by Proposition 1, at µ+, i = 0. Writing (12) at µ+,
while substituting the formulas for ¹and ¤ given in Proposition 2 for cases 2 and 3,







[1¡ ®]F (µ+) ¡ [1 ¡ ®]
f (µ+)
¾
which reduces to (21).
28D Proposition 4
It is useful to refer to Figure 1 in order to see how the various cases are related to each
other. The switch from Case 1 to Case 2 occurs when the value S0
1 of S0 is such that µL











+ 1 ¡ ®
This implies S0
1 < µL. The switch between Case 2 and Case 3 occurs when the value S0
2













2 = µL. The switch between Case 3 and Case 4 occurs when the value
S0










3 = µH. The switch between Case 4 and Case 5 occurs when value S0
4 of








¡ [1 ¡ ®]
which implies S0
4 > µH.
In cases 2 and 3, (21) applies; it follows that S0 · µ+ and that the inequality is strict
unless µ+ = µH; similarly, in cases 3 and 4, (20) implies S0 ¸ µ¡ and the inequality is
strict unless µ¡ = µL.
29E Lemma 2
Lemma 2 A su±cient condition for the candidate solution described in propositions 1-4
to solve the principal's problem is for f to satisfy Assumption 1.
Proof. The candidate solution described in propositions 1-4 exists since it was obtained
by construction. It satis¯es all conditions for an optimum except that (7) was not
imposed, that the monotonicity of ¤ was not veri¯ed, and that the condition µ¡ < µ+
was not veri¯ed. We have to show that these last three properties are veri¯ed. When i
is constant at zero, (7) is satis¯ed. Let us consider other situations. We start with Case
1, as well as cases 2 and 3 for µ ¸ µ+. Substituting the appropriate values of ¹ and ¤












f(µ) ´ l (µ); a su±cient condition for di
dµ · 0 is l to be non increasing. The
other cases where i is non constant are cases 3 and 4, for µ · µ¡, and Case 5. After











f(µ) ´ h(µ), a su±cient condition for di
dµ · 0 is f to be non decreasing.
It is immediate to verify, using (18), that the monotonicity of ¤ is implied by the
monotonicity of l in cases 2 and 3, while, in case 4, it is implied by (19) and the
monotonicity of h. Similarly, it can be veri¯ed using (20) or (21) that the monotonicity
of h implies µ¡ < µ+.
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33Figure 1: Optimal investment, profit, and shadow price of profit
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Figure 2: Inverse investment demand curve: asymmetric information (continuous line)
and symmetric information (dotted line), S’= 1.40.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Figure 3: Investment as a function of S’ under asymmetric information: high uncertainty
(dotted line) and low uncertainty (continuous line), q = 1.2
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